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Abstract
In virtually all countries that explicitly price carbon, its effective price, i.e. the emissions-
weighted price, remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of this effective
price, using data on an international panel of jurisdictions over the period 1990-2012. First,
we examine the decision to introduce a carbon pricing policy. Second, we shed light on
its stringency. Results show that both the odds of the implementation and the stringency
of the carbon pricing policy are negatively affected by the share of electricity coming from
coal and the relative share of industry in the economy. The results also broadly support
an environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis as gross domestic product increases both the
odds of the implementation and the policy stringency. Institutional and political factors are
found to influence the implementation but not the stringency of carbon pricing schemes.
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1 Introduction
The agreement reached in Paris at the end of 2015 was a diplomatic success. Its environ-
mental benefits are, however, much less clear. If fully implemented, current Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat place the world on
an emissions path that is incompatible with least-cost 2◦C scenarios, the goal stated in the
Accord (United Nations/Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015).1
As the IPCC Working Group II “reasons for concern” make clear, this level bears significant
risks for human development and is likely to place unprecedented pressure on already stressed
ecosystems (IPCC, 2014). Therefore, supplementary commitments to reduce Greenhouse Gases
(GHG) emissions beyond existing INDCs are needed.2 This will, in turn, require the setting up
of new (or the strengthening of existing) environmental policy tools.
∗The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council.
1Compared with the emission levels under least-cost 2◦C scenarios, aggregate GHG emission levels resulting
from the implementation of the INDCs are expected to be higher by 8.7 (4.5 to 13.3) Gt CO2 eq (19 per cent,
range 9-30 per cent) in 2025 and by 15.2 (10.1 to 21.1) Gt CO2 eq (36 per cent, range 24-60 per cent) in 2030
(United Nations/Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016).
2Targets, in the present context, refer to stated emissions reductions objectives. The binding nature of these
objectives obviously differs from one jurisdiction to the other: some of those targets are more credible than
others and/or have received stronger legal status. For more information on the (legally) binding character of
these targets, please see The Global Climate Legislation Database (2015).
Historically, these tools took the form of “command-and-control” regulations, production
quotas and subsidies for electricity from renewable energy sources and, more recently, carbon
pricing instruments such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems (Bennear and Stavins, 2007).3
The focus of this paper is on the latter category.
While the earliest occurrences of these tools can be traced back to the experiences of North-
ern European states (Finland - 1990, Sweden - 1991), their development has only gained momen-
tum in the last few years. According to World Bank (2014), eight new carbon markets started
operations in 2013, including the California Cap-and-Trade Program and five (sub-national)
emissions trading schemes in China. These new schemes added to a group of existing carbon
pricing tools such as the European Union Emissions Trading System or the Regional Green-
house Gases Initiative (RGGI) in the United States as well as a range of taxes explicitly based
on the carbon content of fossil fuels.4
Yet, the introduction of such tools is often faced with strong political economy constraints
(Jenkins, 2014) that influence their design and prevent their full (i.e. socially optimal) imple-
mentation (Del Rio and Labandeira, 2009). Their influence on the implementation of carbon
pricing policies is nonetheless currently under-researched by the literature. While substantial
attention has been paid to the political economy of energy or renewable energy support (RES)
policies, a relatively narrow set of studies have specifically focused on policies making use of car-
bon pricing mechanisms, be it in a specific national or subnational context, or in an international
panel of countries.
Our study is a contribution to filling this gap. It aims at shedding light on the nature
and working of political economy constraints on the development of carbon pricing policies by
providing a quantitative assessment of some of them in an international panel of jurisdictions.
We believe that a better understanding of the political economy dynamics at play may hold
substantial implications for the design of climate mitigation strategies. Put differently, our paper
is concerned with the design of climate mitigation strategies in the presence of political economy
constraints. Such investigation deals with two questions in particular. How should we adapt the
policy design to a specific institutional and economic context? Do political economy constraints
3Even though carbon per se is not a greenhouse gas but rather carbon dioxide is, we will refer to instruments
putting a price on CO2 emissions as carbon pricing instruments. Moreover, in this paper, carbon pricing instru-
ments encompass both carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes even though the latter sometimes include
other greenhouse gases than CO2.
4For a comprehensive review of the latest developments in carbon pricing mechanisms, please see the full
reports, available here: World Bank, 2014, World Bank, 2015.
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constitute a robust rationale in favor of a policy mix as opposed to a single instrument?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant strands of the literature.
Section 3 briefly discusses carbon pricing (in theory and practice) and introduces the Effective
Carbon Price. Section 4 presents the hypotheses and data. Section 5 discusses the empirical
methodology used in the analysis and the results. Section 6 provides a contextualised discussion
and section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
More often than not, economic policies resulting from the legislative and political bargaining
process constitute sub-optimal social outcomes. Political economy theory provides a useful
analytical framework to rationalise them. Olson (1965) highlights the role played by groups
with shared interests in shaping policy outcomes and the factors that drive their behaviour. In
particular, he emphasises that the mere existence of a common and shared interest among a
group of individuals is not sufficient to guarantee that the group will be institutionalised and
seek “the furtherance of the interests of [its] members” (Olson (1965), p.5). A classic collective
action problem arises where, in the absence of credible coercion devices, the group interest will
not be furthered; even more so when the cost of doing so increases (e.g. when the number of
members in the group rises). Building on Olson’s conjecture, Stigler (1971) proposed the idea
of regulatory capture, which views the State as a provider of regulation and the industry as an
active seeker of regulation designed and operated for its own benefit.
The relevance of these theoretical insights has long been discussed in the context of envi-
ronmental policy making (Pearce, 2005). Congleton (1992) takes an institutional perspective
to the issue and proposes that political institutions, rather than resource endowments, deter-
mine a country’s environmental regulation. More precisely, he argues that due to their focus
on longer term outcomes, democratic institutions tend to deliver more stringent environmental
regulations.5 At the same time, democratic systems allow a plurality of, sometimes diver-
gent, interests to be voiced. Hahn (1990) attempted to identify rationales for the emergence of
incentive-based mechanisms and suggested that environmental policy is the result of a “strug-
gle” between different interest groups. In the context of carbon pricing, the introduction of
(economy-wide) schemes may induce profound changes in the magnitude and distribution of
welfare. Therefore, even if the welfare of the polity as a whole is greater in an economic system
5Note that this argument is at odds with the standard view that political representatives are self-interested
and focused on short-term electoral cycles.
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constrained by environmental policies, one may expect strong opposition on the part of both
consumers and producers.
On the consumption side, some studies have shown that the willingness to pay for carbon
emissions is low (Jenkins, 2014). Moreover, carbon pricing schemes have been found to be
regressive, with varying degrees, in a wide range of institutional contexts (Wier et al., 2005;
Grainger and Kolstad, 2010; Shammin and Bullard, 2009). However, carbon pricing schemes can
be – and some actually are – designed to alleviate this effect (Bowen, 2015). On the production
side, sectors with assets whose value would be severely diminished in case of carbon pricing are
expected to strongly oppose policy change. See Joskow and Schmalesee (1998) for evidence of
such behaviour in the case of the U.S. SO2 market.
6
Analyses taking advantage of the availability of panel data have also shed light on political
economy dynamics. Marques et al. (2010) analyse the drivers of the deployment of renewable
energy in European countries. Using fixed effects (panel data) regression and vector decompo-
sition, they find evidence that the conventional energy sector lobby and the level of CO2 emis-
sions impede the deployment of renewable energy sources for electricity production. Chang and
Berdiev (2011) focus on the electricity and gas industries and seek to disentangle the effects of
government ideology, political factors and globalisation on energy regulation in 23 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1975-2007. They conclude that left-wing governments promote regulation
in gas and electricity sectors and that less fragmented governments contribute to deregulation
of gas and electricity industries. van Beers and Strand (2015) conduct an empirical analysis
of the political determinants of fossil fuel pricing. Using data on 200 countries for the period
1991-2010, they analyse the effect of a set of economic and political variables on gasoline and
diesel prices. Their main findings are that higher GDP levels lead to higher fuel prices (higher
taxes or lower subsidy rates) and that plurality in voting or a presidential system leads to sig-
nificantly lower gasoline and diesel prices than parliamentarian or proportional representation
systems.
Lastly, some insights drawn from analyses of the liberalisation of energy markets are also
relevant to our investigation. Pollitt (2012) takes stock of the energy market liberalisation
processes to draw lessons about the role of policy in energy transitions. One key insight from
the analysis is that liberalisation per se will have little impact on the shift toward a low carbon
6This links to a recent literature on stranded assets, which seeks to draw the attention toward assets that may
suffer unanticipated or premature write downs in case of the introduction of carbon pricing policies.
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energy mix. Rather, the willingness of societies to bear the cost of environmental policies will.
Nonetheless, liberalisation is not necessarily neutral for carbon pricing policy formulation as it
has made the cost of those policies increasingly apparent to consumers (Pollitt, 2012). This, in
essence, can be linked to the argument of Jenkins (2014): some evidence from the U.S. suggests
that citizens are quite sensitive to the direct costs induced by carbon pricing policies, even if
the net cost is brought (close) to zero via tax rebates or other fiscal mechanisms.
However substantial the discussion of political economy factors in environmental policy
formulation has been, relatively less attention has been paid to the political feasibility of car-
bon pricing policies and, equivalently, to the variables that influence their implementation and
strength. Consequently, suggestions about a way forward for the implementation of carbon pric-
ing when faced with political economy constraints are, at best, incomplete. To our knowledge,
only Jenkins (2014), Gawel et al. (2014) and Del Rio and Labandeira (2009) bring the issue to
the fore. Taking stock of these analyses, we will endeavour to shed light on the factors driving
the implementation and stringency of carbon pricing policies. Before turning to that analysis,
however, we briefly review the rationale and tools for a carbon price.
3 Carbon pricing policies: theory and practice
3.1 The theory
When the concerns about the effects of GHG accumulation on Global Mean Temperature
– and likely adverse economic consequences – first emerged, “doing nothing” was considered
as a legitimate option (Barbier and Pearce, 1990). To put it in Nordhaus’ terms, at the time,
“the best investment to ameliorate the CO2 problem [. . . ] [was] probably to expand our CO2
knowledge” (Nordhaus, 1989). Roughly a quarter of a century later, substantial investment has
gone into the expansion of that knowledge, and a broad consensus about the effects of additional
CO2 emissions has emerged: their accumulation in the atmosphere strengthens the greenhouse
effect, leading to an increase in Global Mean Temperature.
This, in turn, bears adverse environmental effects and, ultimately, induces economic costs
(Bowen, 2011). In other words, any tonne of CO2 emitted in the atmosphere implies a marginal
damage. Avoiding excessive emissions and the ensuing economic cost is the main rationale
behind the reduction of GHG emissions.7
To achieve such reductions, various jurisdictions have implemented market-based tools to
7To the extent that regulatory authorities aim at reducing emissions below a Business As Usual scenario, this
is equivalent to laying the case for a strictly positive price of carbon.
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create a price on GHG emissions. Two mechanisms (and hybrid combinations8) have emerged:
carbon taxes and Emissions Trading Schemes. The former places a set price on each unit of
CO2 emitted into the atmosphere, leaving an uncertainty about the resulting level of emissions;
the latter sets an emissions cap and leaves to the market the creation of the ensuing price signal.
Even though both mechanisms share the same underlying motivation and, under complete
knowledge and perfect certainty, are theoretically equivalent and deliver the same environmental
outcome, they relate to two slightly different views about carbon pricing.9 The first view
emphasises the use of carbon pricing mechanisms to internalise the externality associated with
GHG emissions and hence is more sympathetic to carbon taxes. In that case, the price of carbon
should closely track the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). The second stresses the achievement of a
set carbon budget over a given planning horizon in a cost-effective way. In that case, the price
will follow the dynamically cost-effective price path (Rubin, 1996).
Finally, theory provides us with one additional insight: provided that the public authority
can credibly commit to a state-contingent carbon price path and in the absence of transaction
costs, the signal (i.e. the price of carbon) should be economy-wide (Tirole, 2012). The external-
ity associated with the release of GHG into the atmosphere is the same regardless of its source
(i.e. sector of origin) or type of use. Therefore, the price signal associated with GHG emissions
ought to be the same across the economy and cover all emissions.10 Any departure from this
situation will inevitably introduce distortions between sectors and/or types of users.
3.2 The practical implementation
The schemes referred to in the above differ in their institutional design and practical imple-
mentation. On the one hand, most carbon taxes are based on the carbon content of fossil fuels
which are used as input in the production process of various economic sectors.11 On the other
8Hybrid schemes combine elements of price and quantity schemes by, e.g. setting floors and caps on the prices
delivered by quantity schemes (Roberts and Spence, 1976; Weitzman, 1978).
9Outcomes may differ when there is uncertainty about either the marginal cost or benefit of abatement and
the relative superiority of one instrument over the other depends on the relative slopes of the marginal abatement
and cost curves around the optimum (Weitzman, 1974). Weitzman’s original article considers only a static one-
period model and so is more relevant to flow rather than stock pollutants like CO2. Pizer (2002) considers a
multi-period calibrated model of CO2 and confirms Weitzman’s conclusion that taxes are superior to quotas for
CO2, while Hoel and Karp (2002) extend the analysis to stochastic dynamic formulations, again supporting the
same conclusion.
10If transaction costs (i.e. costs of monitoring and verification) are positive, then optimal coverage may not be
100%. In that case, additional emissions should be included only if the marginal benefit in terms of enhanced cost
efficiency outweighs the marginal cost of monitoring and verifying emissions. However, as far as CO2 emissions
are concerned, it isn’t clear that transaction costs are high – after all, one can easily tax the source of carbon,
i.e. fossil fuels. It is true, however, that there are technical difficulties in implementing schemes covering other
greenhouse gases and that, hence, it might be sub-optimal to aim at a 100% coverage of CO2e.
11It is to be noted, however, that carbon tax schemes need not be based on this indirect measurement approach.
Direct measurement of actual emissions at the source is technically feasible.
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hand, an Emissions Trading Scheme is based on actual verified emissions at covered (stationary)
plants.12 Therefore, an ETS can include fugitive emissions and not only emissions from fuel
combustion.
In 2015, 35 national and 21 subnational jurisdictions had an operating Emissions Trading
Scheme while 15 national and 1 subnational jurisdiction had a carbon tax targeting at least one
type of fossil fuel (i.e. coal, oil or natural gas). Among all jurisdictions operating an ETS, 47
cover industry and 54 cover the power sector while the same sectors are included in 14 and 12
carbon tax schemes, respectively. The following table provides a summary of the sectors covered
by any type of scheme and the number of jurisdictions in which scheme they are included.13
Table 1: Sectoral coverage – # of jursidictions
Carbon tax schemes ETSs
(total: 16) (total: 56)
Industry 14 47
Power 12 54
(Road) Transport 12 5
Aviation∗ 4 31
Buildings (residential and commercial) 12 8
Agriculture or Forestry 11 2
Waste 12 1
∗Domestic aviation only.
Note: The figures presented in this table count each jurisdiction participating
in the EU-ETS as a separate scheme.
As we shall see in the next section, recent – and less recent – experience with carbon
pricing policies suggests that their implementation has rarely, if at all, followed theoretical
prescriptions. For example, most of the schemes under consideration entailed low coverage at
time of introduction – due to, e.g., user(sectoral) or fuel-based exemptions, or a combination
of the two. Besides, careful observation of policy developments shows no consistency between
the stated environmental goals (and implied GHG budgets) and carbon prices. Several political
economy factors may explain these discrepancies. We now turn to their analysis.
4 Carbon pricing and its drivers
Following our discussion in section 3, we argue that introducing a carbon pricing mechanism
involves two stages. First, a decision on whether or not to enact a pricing scheme, regardless
of the price level or the coverage. Second, a discussion about the appropriate (or politically
12Emissions from the aviation sector, which have recently been included in some ETSs, are estimated based
on the fuel consumption of each aircraft, multiplied by the appropriate emissions factor (European Commission,
2012).
13A description of the sectoral nomenclature is available in appendix B and a complete list of the jurisdictions
operating a carbon pricing mechanism in 2015 is available in appendix E.
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feasible) intensity (i.e. price level and coverage).
Therefore, our empirical investigation shall consist of two stages: the first one consists of
a panel logit regression with a dummy variable reflecting the presence or absence of a pricing
mechanism as dependent variable; the second one is a standard (fixed-effects) panel regression
with the Effective Carbon Price as dependent variable, which we describe in the next section,
before turning to our hypotheses and the description of our explanatory variables.
4.1 Carbon price and coverage: an Effective Carbon Price
Following ‘first-best’ theoretical prescriptions, applied macroeconomic integrated assessment
models often assume a single economy-wide carbon price. Consequently, the ensuing discussions
implicitly assume that the introduced scheme covers 100% of a jurisdiction’s GHG. Yet, when it
comes to actual policy-making one realises that coverage is, at best, partial, and varies over time
(see, e.g., World Bank, 2014). Therefore, the price tag alone cannot appropriately reflect the
intensity of a carbon pricing scheme. It has to be analysed together with its coverage. Moreover,
as will be shown in section 4.1.2, the carbon price is usually not unique within jurisdictions, let
alone across them.
In order to accurately account for these two dimensions of carbon pricing mechanisms and
reflect their intensity, we introduce the concept of an Effective Carbon Price (ECP).14 This
price, computed on a yearly basis, is an emissions-weighted average of all carbon price signals
present in an economy at a point in time. The weights are the quantity of emissions covered at
each price as a share of that jurisdiction’s total GHG emissions. Before turning to a detailed
discussion of the methodology for the calculation of the ECP, we review its two underlying
components: coverage and price.
4.1.1 Coverage
The coverage of carbon pricing schemes is usually defined at the sectoral level although, as
will be clarified below, carbon taxes are defined per fuel type too. The main difference between
emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes lies in that the former often cover multiple gases
whereas the latter only apply to the carbon content of fossil fuels and, by extension, to CO2
emissions.15
14The methodology behind the computation of the Effective Carbon Price is similar to that suggested for the
Effective Carbon Rate (OECD, 2015). However, unlike the OECD, which accounts for both explicit carbon prices
and energy duties that indirectly price carbon, we focus on explicit carbon prices only.
15Some countries do have a tax on other GHGs, although these were initially introduced for ozone layer
preservation motives. For example, Denmark levies a duty on CFCs, PFCs and HFCs (OECD, 2016). The scope
of the present analysis is restricted to carbon taxes. However, since CO2 emissions constitute the main source of
GHG emissions, we believe that it does not impair the validity of the study.
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Provided that accurate measurement of sectoral GHG emissions is available, one can easily
translate sectoral and gas coverage into “covered” GHG emissions as a share of total GHG emis-
sions. Total GHG emissions (excluding land use change) are taken from the CAIT Climate Data
Explorer (2015) of the World Resources Institute. ETS-covered emissions (“verified emissions”)
are taken from the respective schemes’ registries while the tax-covered emissions are computed
using estimated sector-fuel disaggregated CO2 emissions (IEA, 2016).
16
The combination of these three sources allows for the calculation of coverage figures (as a
share of a jurisdiction’s total GHG emissions) for 136 national jurisdictions between 1990 and
2012.17 In addition, coverage figures are computed (or collected from secondary sources) for 63
subnational jurisdictions for the same time period (50 US States and 13 Canadian Provinces
and Territories).
Figure 1 provides an overview of the coverage of carbon pricing mechanisms in selected
jurisdictions. Panel (a) clearly shows that there is significant variation in coverage of carbon
tax schemes across jurisdictions. Between 1992 and 2005, Denmark’s scheme covered roughly
70% of its GHG emissions, the highest share among all jurisdictions considered, while Finland’s
coverage was only 30%. It is also striking to see that if those schemes imply a significant
coverage in terms of respective national emissions, they mean very little in terms of world GHG
emissions, as illustrated by the “World” line. Except for the “structural break” observed in 2005
for some countries, which reflects the fact that they adapted their legislation to avoid an overlap
with the EU-ETS, coverage of GHG emissions by tax schemes is, for each country individually,
relatively stable over time. Similarly, the coverage induced by the ETS in the selected countries
does not show significant variation over time.18 Yet, one notes that all countries that are part
of the EU-ETS exhibit different coverage figures, despite the ETS being harmonised across all
countries. A potential explanation for these cross-country differences is that they reflect the
differences in economic structure across participating countries.
In addition to the jurisdictions presented in Figure 1 several others have introduced carbon
pricing policies. Switzerland introduced a carbon tax in 2008 covering about 28% of its total
emissions.19 The coverage remained relatively stable over time, with the scheme covering 27%
16Since the institutional design of emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes differ slightly, calculation of the
coverage occurs according to different methodologies. See appendix B for a description of the methodology and
a list of national ETS registries.
17The panel dimension is constrained by IEA emissions data availability; the time dimension by CAIT data
availability.
18This is essentially due to the fact that the scope of the EU-ETS has not been modified over the period of
analysis, which ends in 2012.
19The pilot phase of the Swiss ETS started in 2008. During that phase, the firms covered by the tax scheme
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Figure 1: Carbon pricing coverage – selected EU-ETS countries
of emissions in 2012. In that same year, Japan introduced a carbon tax covering 69% of
its emissions. Other jurisdictions opted for ETSs. This is the case of New Zealand, which
introduced its scheme in 2010 with a coverage of 43% (gradually increased to 54% following
inclusion of waste treatment activities in the scheme).
At the subnational level, another group of jurisdictions can be identified: US States partici-
pating in the Regional Greenhouse Gases Initiative (RGGI). This scheme is a regional initiative
gathering initially 10 (but now 9) North-Eastern US States.20 Figure 2 shows the implied
coverage of the scheme in the 10 participating states over the period 2009 (start year)-2012.
It is again striking to see that substantial cross-state variation characterizes coverage. New
Hampshire exhibits the highest coverage over the entire period, oscillating between 36.41% in
2009 and 34.42% in 2012. The coverage in all other participating states is between 13.19%
(New Jersey - 2009) and 34.42% (New Hampshire - 2012). Outside the RGGI initiative, British
Columbia launched its own carbon tax scheme in 2008, covering roughly 70% of its total GHG
emissions while, in 2013, California introduced a Cap-and-Trade (CaT) mechanism covering
approximately 32% of its emissions.21
were given the opportunity to opt-in the ETS. The significance of the Swiss ETS over that period is relatively
limited. Hence it is not included in the data.
20The state of New Jersey pulled out of the scheme in 2012.
21In 2012, the coverage of the California CaT was 32%. It remained unchanged until the end of the first
compliance period (December 31st, 2014). As of January 1st, 2015, new activities were added to the scheme,
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Figure 2: Carbon pricing coverage – US RGGI
4.1.2 Price
Coverage is only one side of the coin. The other is the price level. Countries that have
introduced carbon pricing policies have experimented with different strengths of the price signal.
The price varies mainly along three dimensions: time, jurisdiction, and sector.22 In other
words, the price signal varies both across and within countries, introducing distortions between
countries as well as between sectors of a given country. Importantly, however, distortions
introduced by the Emissions Trading Schemes are between covered and non-covered sectors
(since the price signal is the same across all covered sectors) whereas a carbon tax scheme also
introduces distortions among covered sectors since the tax rate applicable to each of them may
differ. Figure 3 displays the total (i.e. the sum of the tax rate and the ETS allowance price,
as applicable) price of CO2 (in 2014 $(US)/tCO2e) in selected sectors of selected countries for
coal.23
The carbon price does not vary much across fuels. In other words, most tax schemes apply
the same tax rate to all fossil fuels. The most significant variations arise across countries and,
hence, across sectors within those countries. A look at panel (b) of Figure 3 shows that, among
increasing coverage to about 85% of California’s total GHG emissions.
22Note that for tax schemes, the CO2 tax rate can further vary according to the type of fuel within each sector.
23Figures A.1 and A.2, available in appendix A, show the total price for oil and natural gas, respectively.
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Figure 3: Total carbon price over time – coal/peat
the selected countries, the power sector in Sweden is confronted to the highest price signal
whereas the sectors in the other countries face much lower carbon prices.
Price heterogeneity across types of fuels is however not observable in jurisdictions whose
emissions are covered by an ETS only. A case in point is the US RGGI. The price of emissions
in the power sector is the same across all participating states, regardless of the fossil fuel used.24
The multiplicity of price signals within (some) jurisdictions identified here raises the question
of their aggregation at an economy-wide level. As alluded to earlier, the aggregation method
used here uses shares of total GHG emissions as weights. This is the focus of the next section.
4.1.3 The Effective Carbon Price (ECP)
Combining coverage and price information allows for the calculation of an Effective Carbon
Price (ECP). The ECP can be computed at the sectoral or economy-wide level. In the former
case, the weights are the emissions as a share of that sector’s total GHG emissions; in the latter,
24The yearly average price (/tCO2e) of allowances in the RGGI was: $US 3.3 in 2009, $US 2.28 in 2010, $US
1.99 in 2011, $US 2.49 in 2012.
12
the weights are the emissions as a share of the jurisdiction’s total GHG emissions.
Computing the ECP requires that each emitted ton of GHGs be attributed the correct price
signal. That is, emissions that are covered by either a tax or an ETS receive the corresponding
tax rate or permit price as price tag while emissions of a sector covered by a tax and an ETS
receive the sum of the tax rate and the permit price. Hence, although the ECP has been
computed using sector-level price and coverage data, its actual value boils down to the average
price of emissions as computed by the ratio of the total economy-wide carbon price revenue
divided by total GHG emissions.25
The evolution of the ECP in selected countries over the period 1990-2012 is presented in
Figure 4. One observes that among all selected countries, only Sweden’s ECP has increased
steadily over time. All other countries exhibit either constant (e.g. Norway) or decreasing (e.g.
Denmark) ECPs. Moreover, contrary to what is generally understood, the ECP varies across
countries that are part of the EU-ETS. This is due in part to the presence of carbon taxes
in some – but not all – countries, which create an additional price signal for some emissions.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is due to differences in the relative size of sectors and
their respective CO2 intensity, as mentioned in section 4.1.1. This feature is particularly well
illustrated by the Effective Carbon Price of states participating in the US RGGI (Figure 5):
despite a single common price for emissions allowances, the effective carbon price differs across
them.
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Figure 4: ECP – selected jurisdictions
25See appendix C for a formal presentation.
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Lastly, some countries’ ECP exhibit more variability than others. For this specific group of
countries, this is due to the relative importance of emissions covered by the EU-ETS as opposed
to those covered by the respective national carbon taxes. Indeed, the (futures) price of EUAs,
i.e. EU-ETS emissions allowances, exhibited strong variability between 2005 and 2012.
2009 2010 2011 2012
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
C
o
n
st
a
n
t 
2
0
1
4
 $
U
S
 (
/t
C
O
2
e
)
Effective Carbon Price - RGGI
NY
NH
VT
RI
MA
NJ
CT
ME
MD
DE
Figure 5: ECP – RGGI
4.1.4 Assessing the ‘policy gap’: the ECP versus the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC)
In addition to capturing the effective level of the CO2 price tag in any given economy, the
Effective Carbon Price provides a metric to assess what may be termed the ‘carbon policy gap’,
i.e. the difference between the effective price of carbon and its socially optimal price for that
economy. Indeed, should the regulatory authority aim at internalising the externality resulting
from GHG emissions and assuming a 100% coverage of GHGs-emissions, the ECP should closely
track the evolution of the SCC over time. Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) are
different for each jurisdiction and hence the ECP should be evaluated against the relevant SCC.
As an illustration, table 2 provides estimates of the SCC for the United States in 5-year steps
for the period 2010-2050.
4.2 Hypotheses and data
4.2.1 Electricity sector
Any form of carbon pricing that includes the power sector imposes costs on those electricity
producers that produce electricity from fossil fuels. Therefore, we expect the structure of the
electricity production mix to influence the stance that the electricity sector takes towards any
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Table 2: US EPA - Social Cost of CO2, 2010-2050 (2014 $US/tCO2)
Discount Rate 5% 3% 2.5% 3%
Year Avg Avg Avg 95th
2010 11 35 57 98
2015 13 41 64 120
2020 14 48 71 140
2025 16 53 78 158
2030 18 57 83 173
2035 21 63 89 192
2040 24 69 96 209
2045 26 74 102 225
2050 30 79 108 242
Source: Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2013). Note: For each year and each
discount rate, SCC values are calculated by combining distribution estimates of five different scenarios
from three Integrated Assessment Models (i.e. DICE, FUND and PAGE). Each scenario and model
receive equal weight, producing an “average” distribution of the SCC. The average (mean) of that
distribution is the value reported in the first three columns of the above table. The fourth column
reports the 95th percentile value of that distribution for a 3% interest rate.
carbon pricing regulation (Olson, 1965). The larger the share of electricity produced from fossil-
fuelled power plants, the higher the potential profit decreases and capital losses and, hence, the
less politically feasible carbon pricing regulation will be.
This argument needs to be nuanced, however. First, the extent to which carbon pricing
policies affect the value of covered firms depends on their capacity to pass the additional cost
through to consumers. Under perfect competition and 100% pass through of the cost of carbon,
electricity producing firms’ profits will remain largely unaffected. On the contrary, if firms are
unable to pass the cost through entirely, then the change in equilibrium market price will not
entirely reflect the increase in cost and firms’ (economic) profit will be affected. Second, one does
not necessarily expect the electricity generating sector to react in the same way to a carbon tax
and a cap-and-trade system. In the case of the former, the sector will, at best, remain unaffected
whereas in the case of an ETS, the possibility of capturing significant “windfall profits” exists
if emissions permits are freely allocated.
The possibility of capturing such profits has probably played a significant role in dampening
the opposition of affected sectors to the introduction of such schemes. Several studies have
examined that possibility and the associated rent-seeking behaviour both theoretically (Rode,
2013) and empirically (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005). The empirical evidence suggests that
powerful (and CO2 intensive) sectors were successful in influencing the design of GHG trading
systems. In fact, except for the US RGGI, all emissions trading schemes have been introduced
with close to 100% free allocation of emission permits (World Bank, 2014). Although it is
difficult to explicitly account for such effects in our econometric investigation, it is likely to
reduce the magnitude of the coefficients on the variables accounting for the role of CO2 intensive
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sectors, including the electricity sector.
To investigate the role played by the electricity generating sector, we use the share of elec-
tricity generation in total electricity generation from coal, gas and oil, respectively.26 These
variables have previously been used in the literature by Marques et al. (2010). For national
jurisdictions, the data is taken from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2016).
The data for US States and Canadian Provinces are taken from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2015) and Statistics Canada (2016a), respectively. We expect these variables
to negatively affect the odds of implementation and the stringency of carbon pricing policies.
4.2.2 Industry
The electricity producing industry is not the only sector likely to express concerns about
a policy that holds the potential to increase production costs. Other energy-intensive sectors,
broadly defined as “industry” are likely to oppose a carbon pricing scheme. Moreover, as
emphasised by Aldy and Pizer (2012), those sectors that are export-oriented should be even more
reluctant as the introduction of a carbon price risks putting them at a competitive disadvantage
in international markets. The strength of this international competitiveness concern will, in
turn, depend on the relative size of the sector in the economy and its carbon intensity. Not all
sectors, however, suffer from this problem. In particular, sectors whose activities cannot easily
be relocated away from the destination market (e.g. the power sector, cement production) are
less prone to relocation due to the introduction of carbon pricing mechanisms or, more generally,
tighter environmental policies. For instance, among all the schemes considered in this study, 66
out of 72 cover the power sector and 61 out of 72 cover industry (see Table 1).
There are two channels via which costs to industry could be pushed upward by a carbon
pricing policy. The first is a direct channel: CO2 intensive industries that fall within the scope
of a carbon pricing scheme will have to pay the price for their own CO2 emissions. The second
is a more indirect one: the introduction of carbon pricing policies, which cover the electricity
generating sector, will lead to an increase in wholesale (and retail) electricity prices (as has been
observed after the introduction of the EU-ETS (Sijm et al., 2008) which, in turn, will raise the
production cost of electricity-intensive industries. This argument closely follows that of Cadoret
and Padovano (2016).
We consider the value added of industry (as a share of GDP) as proxy for the strength of
26Note that since the only countries retaining a substantial share of oil in their electricity production mix are
Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) countries and small island states, this variable can also be interpreted
as a proxy for a geographical dummy including the said countries.
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the lobbies of energy-intensive (electricity-intensive) industries. Data for national jurisdiction is
taken from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2016) whereas data for US States
and Canadian Provinces is computed based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.
Department of Commerce (2016) and Statistics Canada (2016b), respectively. We expect the
relative share of industry to influence negatively both the odds of the implementation and the
stringency of the policy.
4.2.3 Political and institutional variables
A relatively high degree of institutional capacity is a prerequisite for the introduction of
any form of regulation and, a fortiori, to introduce a carbon pricing scheme. Consequently, we
introduce an institutional capacity indicator. Following Steves et al. (2011), that indicator is
constructed as the simple average of the World Bank’s “Government Effectiveness” and “Reg-
ulatory Quality” indicators (World Bank, World Governance Indicators, 2016).27 We expect
institutional capacity to be positively correlated with the presence of a carbon pricing scheme
but not necessarily with the level of the ECP. Indeed, the “institutional burden” arises from
the creation of such a scheme, regardless the level of the price associated with it.
Second, we explore the effect of several aspects of the political structure of each jurisdiction
with the aim of disentangling their role in the development of carbon pricing policies. First,
we consider the type of political regime (democracy vs. autocracy). The role of the political
system has been discussed in earlier literature by, e.g., Congleton (1992). He argues that
autocrats’ time horizon is shorter than that of democratic planners and they therefore set weaker
environmental targets. Yet, on the other hand, liberal democracies tend to offer the possibility
for different interest groups to express their views and “weigh” on the legislative process. In such
a case, regulatory outcomes will be a balancing act that reflects the relative bargaining power
of the different interest groups (Hahn, 1990). This could work both in favour or against the
introduction of carbon pricing policies, depending on the relative lobbying strengths of interest
groups in the jurisdiction. The democracy composite indicator is taken from the Center for
Systemic Peace, Polity IV project (2015). National averages are assigned to corresponding
subnational jurisdictions.
Next, following the literature on the political economy of environmental policy we consider
the role of government ideology. Previous studies have found left wing governments to implement
27Note that the estimates of government effectiveness and regulatory quality are only available at the national
level. Subnational jurisdictions are assigned the value the corresponding national jurisdiction.
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more stringent environmental policies (Chang and Berdiev, 2011; Cadoret and Padovano, 2016).
Fankhauser et al. (2015), however, found the political orientation of the government to be
irrelevant to the number of climate laws passed in their sample of jurisdictions. To investigate
such effects we create a variable Left, which takes value 1 whenever the ruling party is identified
as left wing party and 0 otherwise. The national-level data on political orientation of government
is taken from Cruz et al. (2016). Data at the subnational level is not available.
We also test the effect of international institutional frameworks. Far from discarding the
autonomous policy development dynamics present at the country-level, membership of interna-
tional organisations (such as the OECD or the EU) or international institutional frameworks
(such as the Annex-I countries of the Kyoto Protocol) plays a significant role in the presence and
development of carbon pricing policies. For example, the EU, a club of countries cooperating
on a wide range of issues – including the environment, has implemented an organisation-wide
emissions trading scheme. Several EU Member countries that are currently operating such a
scheme were “dragged in” and did not willingly sign up for it. This is the case, for instance,
of current EU Member States that joined the Union in 2004, i.e. a year before the start of the
EU-ETS but a few months after Directive 2003/87/EC, which implemented the EU-ETS, was
passed.28 It is relatively clear that some Eastern European countries that joined the EU at the
time had little (if any) say on the development of the legislation pertaining to the creation of
the EU-ETS and implemented it only because it was part of the preexisting legislative acquis
(Robinson and Stavins, 2015).
We also take a closer look at the Kyoto Protocol and the distinction between Annex I and
non-Annex I countries. Having committed to a reduction of their GHG emissions, these coun-
tries may have had an additional incentive to develop climate mitigation strategies, including
carbon pricing policies.
To capture such dynamics, we create two dummy variables. The first one takes value 1
whenever a country is a member of the EU in any given year, 0 otherwise. The second one
takes value 1 for countries listed in Annex-I of the Kyoto Protocol from 1997 onward.29
28The Accession Agreement of the 10 countries meant to join the EU in 2004 was signed in April 2003. This
agreement acknowledges compliance with the acquis communautaire.
29An Annex-II dummy, including all Annex-I countries except Economies in Transition, was used as well in
preliminary analysis but turned out to be non significant.
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4.2.4 Economic environment
Besides the political and institutional environment, we consider the role of the general
economic environment in the development of carbon pricing policies. These general economic
circumstances are captured by real GDP per capita and trade openness. GDP per capita is
introduced to account for differences in the level of development of countries included in the
panel. Pricing the environmental externality related to GHG emissions imposes an additional
cost on GHG-intensive industries and, by extension, on the economy as a whole. For relatively
poorer countries (i.e. countries with a low level of GDP per capita), such cost may be too much
of a burden. Therefore, we expect the level of GDP per capita to have a positive impact on
the odds of implementation of a carbon pricing policy and be positively correlated with the
Effective Carbon Price. In other words, this can be interpreted as an Environmental Kuznets
Curve hypothesis where countries with higher levels of GDP per capita are more inclined to
bear the cost related to the internalization of the environmental externality. GDP per capita is
taken from three different sources. Data for national jurisdictions is available from World Bank,
World Development Indicators (2016); data for US jurisdictions (i.e. States) is taken from
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (2016) whereas data
for Canadian and Chinese provinces are retrieved from Statistics Canada (2016c) and Chinese
Bureau of National Statistics (2016), respectively.
The second economic variable is the trade openness of the economy. It is computed as
the sum of exports and imports (as a share of GDP). Data for national jurisdictions is taken
from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2016) whereas data for U.S. states and
Canadian provinces are taken from U.S. Census Bureau (2016) and Statistics Canada (2016c).
Two arguments relating trade openness to carbon pricing policies can be made. On the one
hand, countries that are open to trade in general may be more receptive to “cap-and-trade”
carbon pricing policies. On the other hand, the same countries may worry that the introduction
of carbon pricing policies will put their economy at a competitive disadvantage. Given this
theoretical ambiguity, we do not form any expectation about the direction of influence of trade
openness on either the odds of implementation of a carbon pricing mechanism or the value of
the ECP.
Table 3 summarizes the selected variables and the expected sign. Table 4 provides their
summary statistics.
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Table 3: Summary of variables
Category Variable Expected sign Expected sign
Carbon Price (Y/N) Carbon Price (Level)
Elec. prod. - coal (% of total) - -
Electricity sector Elec. prod. - oil (% of total) -/0 -/0
& Industry Elec. prod. gas (% of total) -/0 -/0
Industry, VA (% of GDP) - -/n.a.
Political envnt.
EU + +
Annex-I + +
Institutional capacity + n.a.
Level of democracy + n.a.
Left + +
Economic envnmt.
GDP per capita + +
Trade Openness (% of GDP) +/- +/-
4.3 Preliminary analysis
Before proceeding with the estimation, we perform preliminary tests on the data to ensure
that the assumptions required for statistical inference are satisfied. First, a rapid check of
the cross correlation matrix (available in appendix D) reveals that the institutional capacity
variable is highly correlated with GDP per capita (0.75), the group of Annex-I countries (0.79)
and the level of democracy (0.63). In order to avoid multicollinearity issues, we shall therefore
not include them in the same regression models.
Second, we analyse the stationarity of our dependent variable, the effective carbon price. We
use the Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test, whose asymptotic properties best match the properties
of our sample (i.e. large N, fixed number of periods), with no time trend. The test shows that
the panels are stationary (statistic: 0.6605; p-value:0.000).
Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Pricing (1=yes,0=no) 0.069 0.254 0 1 5359
ECP (2014 $US/tCO2e) 0.65 3.98 0 70.79 5382
Elec. Prod - coal (% of total) 24.9 30.3 0 100 4290
Elec. Prod - gas (% of total) 20.4 27.7 0 100 4290
Elec. Prod - oil (% of total) 14.7 25 0 100 4290
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 30.5 11.076 6.3 78.5 4518
GDP per cap. (thousand 2011 $US) 25.327 20.386 0 134.117 4335
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 75 46.6 0.02 439.7 3494
EU 0.081 0.272 0 1 5359
Annex-I 0.392 0.488 0 1 5359
Institutional capacity 0.48 1.033 -2.282 2.174 3256
Level of Democracy 3.883 7.371 -10 10 5183
Left 0.506 0.5 0 1 1883
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5 The model
5.1 To price or not to price?
5.1.1 Econometric specification
We model the logit specification as follows:
Iit = φi +ψ
′Xit + γ′Zit + η′Wit + it (1)
where Iit is an indicator variable capturing the existence of a carbon pricing scheme; Xit is the
m-dimensional vector of industry-specific variables, Zit is the n-dimensional vector of political
and institutional variables and Xit is the p-dimensional vector of economic variables. ψ
′, γ′
and η′ are vectors of dimensions m, n and p, respectively, each element of which corresponds
to the estimated parameter of the associated explanatory variable. The error term is denoted
by it.
5.1.2 Results
Table 5 shows that the estimated effect of the energy mix on the implementation of carbon
pricing policies is in line with our expectations: shares of electricity generation from fossil fuels
negatively affect the odds of implementation. All coefficients are negative except that of the
share of electricity generated from natural gas in specification (1). This coefficient, however,
is not statistically significant. The effect of the share of electricity production from coal is
statistically significant across all estimations except one. The share of electricity produced from
oil significantly decreases the odds of introduction of carbon pricing policies. For instance, in
the first specification, a rise of one percent in the share of electricity produced from oil decreases
the odds by 33%.30 This effect is nonetheless consistent across all specifications, with only minor
variation in its magnitude. As far as gas is concerned, the evidence is much weaker. The effect
is negatively significant in one out of three regressions. This, however, is not entirely surprising
given that natural gas is the fossil fuel with the lowest carbon content and that carbon pricing
policies alter the relative price of fossil fuels in favor of gas-fired power plants.
Similarly, as suggested by the negative relationship between the value added of industry and
the existence of carbon pricing mechanisms, the presence of large (potentially CO2-intensive)
industrial sectors in a jurisdiction’s economy decreases the odds of implementation of such
mechanisms. The effect is particularly strong: a 1% increase in a country’s share of industry
30exp (−0.396) = 0.673. The decrease in the odds is 1-0.673 = 0.327.
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value added in GDP leads to a 67% decrease in the odds of introduction of a carbon pricing
policy.
The general level of development (as measured by the level of GDP per capita), on the
contrary, has a positive effect on the odds of introduction of a carbon pricing mechanism. A
$1000 increase in GDP per capita results, on average, in a multiplication of the odds by 2.44
(regression 1). Although the magnitude of this effect changes depending on the econometric
specification, the direction of the induced change is stable across all estimated models. As
carbon pricing policies induce additional (private) costs, economic agents are more likely to
support the introduction of such policies if they are relatively better off.
Similarly, trade openness has a positive effect on the odds of implementation (specification
1), which suggests that more open economies are more likely to introduce carbon pricing mech-
anisms. However, it is possible that this result is partly driven by EU countries which all have
a (common) carbon pricing policy and, at the same time, trade heavily with each other.
The results also highlight the (international) institutional dynamics at play in the develop-
ment of carbon pricing policies. Since many jurisdictions that currently have carbon pricing
policies are members of the European Union, the variable capturing EU membership is, un-
surprisingly, found to have a significant impact on the odds of instituting a carbon pricing
mechanism.31
International institutional dynamics form one part of the story but do not explain it all.
The local political environment also plays a pivotal role. The level of democracy is found to sig-
nificantly influence the odds of implementation: as suggested by Congleton (1992), jurisdictions
experiencing a higher level of democracy are more likely to implement a form of carbon pricing
mechanism. On the contrary, the variable capturing government ideology shows no significance
across all estimated models, suggesting that the introduction of carbon pricing policies are not
necessarily associated with one political ideology in particular. This does not mean, however,
that, in a given jurisdiction, all parties support the introduction of carbon pricing policies. It
only means that, in the sample currently considered, such policies have received support from
parties across the political spectrum.
Finally, since the institutional capacity is strongly correlated with the level of GDP per
capita (ρ = 0.75), we test its effect on the odds of pricing in a separate regression (specification
31Note, however, that some countries that introduced carbon pricing mechanisms did so before joining the EU.
For instance, this is the case of Norway and Sweden, which introduced their respective schemes in the early 1990s
and became members of the European Union in 1995.
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3). There is no evidence that it significantly influences the odds of implementation.
Table 5: Panel logistic regression – estimation results
Pricing (1=yes,0=no) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elec. Prod - coal (% of total) -0.134∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0308) (0.0320) (0.0347)
Elec. Prod - gas (% of total) -0.000160 -0.0250 0.0548∗ 0.0419
(0.0287) (0.0540) (0.0238) (0.0395)
Elec. Prod - oil (% of total) -0.246∗∗ -0.305∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.0797) (0.100) (0.0560) (0.0268)
GDP per cap. (thousand 2011 $US) 0.355∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0861) (0.0573)
Industry, value added (% of GDP) -0.604∗∗∗ -0.711∗∗∗ -0.809∗∗∗ -0.648∗∗∗
(0.0846) (0.188) (0.0789) (0.105)
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 0.0716∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗ 0.0928∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0191) (0.00953) (0.0153)
EU 14.17∗∗∗ 5.570∗∗ 20.79∗∗∗
(1.932) (1.896) (1.805)
Level of Democracy 1.381∗∗∗ 1.203∗ 1.833∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.569) (0.452)
Left -0.546
(0.584)
Institutional capacity 0.478
(0.775)
Annex-I 8.581∗∗∗
(2.606)
Constant -25.18∗∗∗ -18.84∗ -0.701 -50.44∗∗∗
(4.409) (7.812) (2.107) (5.971)
Constant 5.008∗∗∗ 5.454∗∗∗ 5.172∗∗∗ 5.879∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.240) (0.180) (0.189)
Observations 2938 1615 2163 2938
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.2 Policy stringency
5.2.1 Econometric specification
In this second step, our empirical model aims at testing the relationship between the ECP
and the set of variables identified in section 4.2. Hence these estimations focus on the stringency
of the pricing mechanism that is implemented. We use a panel analysis with fixed effects.32 The
standard equation can be modelled as
32The Hausman test comparing the RE and FE estimator strongly supports the use of the fixed-effects esti-
mators. Moreover, estimates are consistent across both fixed- and random-effects estimations.
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ECPit = φi +ψ
′Xit + γ′Zit + η′Wit + it (2)
where ECPit is the Effective Carbon Price; ψ
′,γ′,η′ and XitZit,Wit as well as it are as
before.
5.2.2 Results
We start by analyzing the influence of the energy mix. Results suggest that an electricity
generation system biased towards the use of fossil fuels reduces the stringency of a carbon pricing
mechanism. All variables pertaining to the electricity production mix have a negative effect on
the stringency of the implemented tool, although only the effect of the share of electricity
produced from coal is found to be statistically significant. More precisely, an increase of 1% of
that share is associated with a $0.04 decrease in the Effective Carbon Price (specification 1).
The magnitude of this effect is very close to that of the share of industry value added
in GDP. A larger industrial sector will, on average, decrease the stringency of carbon pricing
policies. More precisely, a 1% increase in the share of industry value added in GDP is associated
with a $0.05 decrease in the ECP, which suggests that jurisdictions with larger (CO2-intensive)
industrial sectors will either reduce the coverage of their legislation or decrease the level of the
price tag associated with a tonne of CO2 emissions. The evidence on the role played by the
electricity generating sector and the industry broadly supports the assumptions made about
them in the section (4.2).
Turning to the general economic environment, we observe that the effect of GDP per capita
on stringency is positive. A $1000 increase in GDP per capita is associated with a $0.13 increase
in the Effective Carbon Price (specification 1). Trade openness, however, does no longer exhibit
a statistically significant effect.
Unsurprisingly, jurisdictions that were part of the European Union had, on average, an ECP
that was roughly $5 higher than other jurisdictions. Slightly more surprising, however, the level
of democracy does not seem to have any significant influence. That is, although it appeared
determinant for the introduction of a carbon pricing policy, there is no evidence of an effect on
the stringency of the policy, a result that is partially at odds with the argument of Congleton
(1992). Eventually, in specification 3, we test the effect of institutional capacity. As expected,
institutional capacity does not significantly affect the stringency of a carbon pricing mechanism.
24
Table 6: Panel (fixed-effects) regression – estimation results
ECP (2014 $US/tCO2e) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elec. Prod - coal (% of total) -0.0463∗∗ -0.0715∗ -0.0495 -0.0458∗
(0.0170) (0.0341) (0.0256) (0.0177)
Elec. Prod - gas (% of total) -0.00893 -0.00720 0.0104 -0.0196
(0.0147) (0.0249) (0.0145) (0.0162)
Elec. Prod - oil (% of total) 0.00249 -0.0104 -0.0122 0.00322
(0.00946) (0.0145) (0.0121) (0.00977)
GDP per cap. (thousand 2011 $US) 0.238∗∗ 0.392∗∗ 0.312∗∗
(0.0789) (0.137) (0.0974)
Industry, value added (% of GDP) -0.0446∗∗ -0.0574∗ -0.0809∗∗∗ -0.0486∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0266) (0.0241) (0.0164)
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 0.00112 -0.00475 0.0164∗ 0.00770
(0.00456) (0.00750) (0.00806) (0.00577)
EU 5.411∗∗ 4.964∗ 5.313∗∗∗
(1.649) (2.044) (1.443)
Level of Democracy -0.0141 -0.106∗∗ -0.0120
(0.0148) (0.0393) (0.0171)
Left -0.624
(0.498)
Institutional capacity -0.153
(0.560)
Annex-I 2.728
(1.505)
Constant -2.190 -1.042 2.872∗∗ -4.283
(1.472) (2.138) (0.968) (2.266)
Observations 2938 1615 2163 2938
R2 0.203 0.245 0.110 0.149
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6 Discussion
The results presented above support the relevance of a political economy explanation to
the implementation of second- (rather than first-) best policies. These results call for some
clarifications. First, one may be tempted to attribute much – if not all – of the carbon pricing
developments to EU-leadership and dismiss the relevance of other factors. This temptation
should be avoided. Both economic and institutional variables retain significant explanatory
power, even after controlling for EU membership. Moreover, if the membership of the EU is a
powerful explanation for the emergence of ETSs, it is much less so for national or subnational
carbon taxes: Sweden and Finland were not part of the EU when they launched their respective
carbon tax schemes and Norway has one but, although it has adopted most of its Directives, is
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still not part of the EU.
Second, the fact that in many jurisdictions the Effective Price of Carbon falls short of the
Social Cost of Carbon should not be interpreted as evidence that those jurisdictions are failing
to tackle climate change. Many of them have supplementary policies in place that implicitly
price GHG emissions and reduce the level of the socially optimal explicit price of carbon. A
central question for those jurisdictions is therefore that of the nature of the tradeoff between
carbon pricing and other climate change mitigation policies.
Third, carbon pricing policies face their own internal tradeoff. Suppose that the stringency
of a given carbon pricing scheme needs to be increased. Should the regulator favour an increase
in the price signal in currently covered sectors or aim at widening the scope of the scheme by
including more sectors? Or is the choice neutral for social welfare?
Fourth, absent from the present analysis is an explicit discussion of the role of revenue
recycling in the political acceptability of carbon pricing policies. Introducing such consideration
in a panel analysis like this one is relatively difficult due to the heterogeneity of schemes and
policies and, as such, would deserve a separate discussion. However, it is to be noted that most
– if not all – of the carbon pricing schemes mentioned in the paper were introduced with some
form of revenue recycling.
Lastly, the present analysis is based on data up to 2012. This is due to the limited availability
of total GHG emissions from the World Resources Institute. Several developments took place
after that year, including, as noted earlier, the launch of seven pilot ETSs in China (five in
2013, two in 2014). Despite being centrally led, further analysis of their development could
provide additional insights into the political economy dynamics leading to carbon pricing: the
design and scope of each of those schemes differ and it is likely that those differences are the
consequence of different economic structures of the regions (provinces or municipalities) in which
they are implemented. Outside China, Quebec launched an ETS in 2013 and linked it with that
of California in 2014 while France and Portugal introduced a carbon tax in 2014 and 2016,
respectively.
7 Conclusion
Carbon pricing policies have (re-)emerged in the policy making arena as credible tools to
achieve (some) reductions in GHG emissions. Extending such tools to new jurisdictions or
strengthening existing ones will require in-depth knowledge of the political economy dynamics
26
governing their development. The present work is a contribution toward that goal. First, it
emphasises the importance of looking at both the coverage and the price level to assess the
stringency of a given carbon pricing scheme and provides data about the Effective Carbon Price
for a large panel of jurisdictions over the period 1990-2012.
Second, it sheds light on the development of carbon pricing policies, looking successively
at the drivers behind their implementation and their intensity in the hope of providing both a
retrospective explanation of past developments and inform prospective policy discussion. We
believe that this objective has been met. Firstly, we have shown that the dynamics driving
the implementation of carbon pricing policies differ from those determining the stringency.
Institutional and political variables play a significant role in the decision to implement – or not
– a carbon pricing mechanism but much less so in the actual stringency of the scheme. This is the
case, for example, of the level of democracy. This partially supports the hypothesis formulated
by Congleton (1992) that democratic institutions are conducive to more stringent environmental
regulations (a carbon price, regardless of its level, is a more stringent policy than no price at all)
and lends support to Hahn’s conclusions (1990) that environmental regulation is a balancing
act between a variety of interests (the actual stringency is determined by the relative weight of
each interest group and not by the ‘democratic’ nature of a political system). However, we were
unable to detect any significant effect from the institutional capacity of a jurisdiction either on
the odds of implementation or the stringency of a carbon pricing mechanism, suggesting that
it is not one of the most determining factors of either of those decisions. Similarly, the political
orientation of a government does not significantly affect the odds of the implementation nor
the stringency of a carbon pricing policy. This result is in line with the findings in Fankhauser
et al. (2015).
Secondly, GDP per capita positively affects both the odds of the implementation of carbon
pricing mechanisms as well as their intensity, supporting the idea that richer jurisdictions are
more inclined to bear the cost associated with the internalisation of the environmental exter-
nality.
Eventually, we hypothesised that an electricity generation sector biased toward fossil fuels
and a large relative share of industry in value added would weaken both the odds of the im-
plementation of a carbon pricing mechanism as well as the intensity of the scheme. This was
confirmed by our empirical analysis: larger shares of electricity produced from fossil fuels, and
coal in particular, lead to a decrease in both the likelihood of implementation of carbon pricing
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mechanisms and the stringency of the introduced tool; similar conclusions are drawn about the
share of industry in total value added.
From a policy making perspective, such results highlight the existence of political economy
constraints that bind the Effective Price of Carbon below optimal levels and suggest that it
would be easier to introduce carbon pricing policies once the electricity sector (and the economy
in a broader sense) has already been partially “de-carbonised”, possibly by means of other
policies. Hence it provides a rationale for the development of climate mitigation strategies with
multiple GHGs abatement tools and, more crucially, emphasises the importance of the sequence
of introduction of different climate policies (Meckling et al., 2015).
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A Carbon prices - data sources and details
For each jurisdiction and each year we collect carbon price data in nominal local currency.
Most jurisdictions quote the price of carbon as per tonne of CO2e; others (essentially those with
carbon taxes) express the carbon price as per natural unit of the fuel. In the latter case, we
transform the price in per tCO2e using conversion factors from the World Resource Institute
(World Resources Institute, 2015). We then convert those values into 2014 $US using the
Official Exchange Rate (Local Currency Unit/$US) and inflation rate from the World Bank,
World Development Indicators (2016).
A.1 Emissions Trading Schemes
Table A.1: ETSs prices – details
Jurisdiction Price information
EU-ETS
The price of European Union emissions Allowances (EUA) quoted in this study is
the EUA futures price. This is the annual average of daily prices. Source:
Bloomberg
Korea, Rep.
The market for Korean Allowance Units (KAUs) has been characterised by high il-
liquidity due to the absence of sellers amid concerns that the market is under-
allocated. The last trade took place on March 15, 2016 at a price of $15.53.
New Zealand
Annual average of daily spot prices of New Zealand Allowances (NZU).
Source: Bloomberg.
Switzerland
As of today, no transaction of Swiss emissions allowances (CHU) has taken place
over a centralised platform. Transactions have either not taken place or occurred
over-the-counter outside of that transaction platform. Hence, no secondary market
data is available. Consequently, the price quoted in this study is the volume-
weighted average price at auction. Source: Swiss Emissions Registry
California(-Quebec)
Annual average of daily California Carbon Allowances (CCA) futures contract
price. Source: California Carbon Dashboard
RGGI
Volume-weighted annual average of spot transactions.
Source: RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking System (COATS).
A.2 CO2 taxes
Information on sectoral fuel tax rates has been retrieved from a wide range of sources. A full
list of sources is available upon request. These sources include (but are not limited to): OECD
Database on Instruments used for Environmental Policy (OECD, 2016), International Energy
Agency Energy Price and Taxes publication (IEA, 2016a), jurisdictions’ budget proposals (as
in the case of, e.g., Norway or Denmark), customs’ agencies documentation, academic journal
articles, policy assessment reports.
A.3 Total CO2 price (oil, natural gas)
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Figure A.1: Total carbon price over time – oil
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Figure A.2: Total carbon price over time – natural gas
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B Scheme’s coverage
This methodological appendix further details the steps involved in the computation of the
coverage figures. As for the carbon prices, a complete list of sources used to create the data
points is available upon request.
Computing coverage figures requires defining a sectoral disaggregation of the economy. For
the sake of consistency with IEA (2016) and CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2015) data, we
adopt the sectoral disaggregation recommended by the IPCC (2006) Guidelines for National
Greenhouse Gases Inventories.33 Table B.1 summarises the sectoral disaggregation.
Table B.1: Sectors
IPCC This study
Manufacturing industries and construction∗ Industry
Electricity and Heat generation∗ Power
Road Transportation Transport
Domestic Aviation Aviation
Residential Buildings - Residential
Commercial and public services Commercial and public services
Agriculture/forestry Agriculture/forestry
Waste Waste
*As highlighted in Appendix B, those sectors are, in some countries and in some years,
covered by a tax and an emissions trading scheme. Therefore, some of our calculations
distinguish between that part of emissions of these sectors that are covered by the tax
scheme and that that is covered by an ETS. The Industry and Power sectors are therefore
each broken down into two “sub-sectors”: ETS and nETS.
Next, differences in design that exist between carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes
matter. The scope of a GHG emissions trading scheme is defined at the sectoral level regardless
of the fuel from which CO2 – and other GHG – emissions originate. Therefore, an emissions
trading scheme requires the measurement of GHG emissions at the point of emission. The case
of carbon (or any other GHG)-taxes is slightly different. Existing carbon taxes are first defined
according to the type of fuel. The sectors to which the tax applies are defined in a second
step. The relevant physical unit to be measured in the case of a carbon tax is therefore the fuel
consumption (per economic sector). A carbon tax is then applied to the consumption of each
type of fuel in each sector by converting a set price for the tonne of CO2 into price per physical
unit of each fuel in each sector using appropriate conversion factors (which are based on the
carbon content of each fuel).
In order to record the information described above, we create a panel which records whether
a given sector (and, for carbon taxes, a given fuel) was covered by a carbon pricing scheme in
33This sectoral disaggregation is itself based on the United Nations International Standards Industrial Classi-
fication (ISIC), Revision 4.
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a given country, in a given year. That information is coded as a binary variable (0 if the sector
is not covered, 1 if it is) and is retrieved from various sources, which vary from one country to
the other. Table B.2 summarises the information recorded.
Table B.2: Institutional design
Carbon Tax Emissions Trading Scheme
Price signal Tax rate (Spot/Futures) Allowance price
(nominal - local currency) (nominal - local currency)
Sectoral coverage
Fuel coverage n.a.
GHG-gas coverage *
(Price) exemptions n.a.
*The only GHG covered by carbon taxes is obviously CO2.
Note: For each jurisdiction and year, except price, all information is coded as a binary
entry.
B.1 CO2 taxes
The last step before the actual calculation of coverage combines IEA (2016), verified emis-
sions and CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2015) data to compute sectoral emissions as shares of
a jurisdiction’s total greenhouse gases emissions.34 The data is disaggregated at the user-fuel
level and the main fuel categories are: Coal/peat, Oil, Natural Gas. The economy-wide coverage
figure is computed according to the following formula
Coveragei,t =
∑
j
∑
k Ei,j,k,t × 1i,j,k,t
Etoti,t
where Ei,j,k,t represents jurisdiction i’s emissions from sector k arising from the combustion of
fuel j in year t; 1i,j,k,t is an indicator variable taking value 1 if fuel k in sector j of country i in
year t is covered by the scheme, 0 otherwise; Etoti,t is the total greenhouse gases emissions in
jurisdiction i in year t.
B.2 Emissions Trading Schemes
Unlike for a carbon tax, aggregation across fuels is irrelevant for coverage of Emissions
Trading Schemes. Hence, the calculation of coverage of an Emissions Trading Scheme entails
one fewer aggregation than that of a carbon tax. Formally,
Coveragei,t =
∑
j Ei,j,t × 1i,j,t
Etoti,t
34For subnational jurisdictions, tax coverage is computed using jurisdiction-specific sources and sometimes
relies on secondary data (i.e. not own computation). This is because IEA CO2 emissions data is available at the
country-level only.
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where Ei,j,t represents jurisdiction i’s (combustion and fugitive) emissions from sector j in year
t; 1i,j,t is an indicator variable taking value 1 if sector j of country i in year t is covered by the
scheme, 0 otherwise; Etoti,t is as above.
Note, however, that a sectoral disaggregation is obviously not a necessary condition for
the calculation of the “aggregate” (i.e. economy-wide) coverage of an ETS scheme. If one is
interested in the aggregate coverage, total (i.e. all sectors) (verified) emissions suffice for the
calculation. For instance, in the case of the California-Quebec CaP or the EU-ETS, we used
total verified emissions data from the California Air Resource Board (2016) and the European
Union Transaction Log (2016), respectively.
The following table provides information about the respective ETSs registries:
Table B.3: Emissions Registries
Scheme Registry name Available at
EU-ETS EU Transaction Log http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/
Switzerland ETS Swiss Emissions Trading Registry https://www.emissionsregistry.admin.ch/. . .
New Zealand ETS NZ Emission Unit Register http://www.epa.govt.nz/e-m-t/reports/. . .
RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking System https://rggi-coats.org/eats/rggi/
California CaT California Air Resource Board http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/. . .
Quebec CaT GHG Emissions Registry http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/. . .
B.3 Overlapping coverage
In a few jurisdictions both a carbon tax and an Emissions Trading Scheme co-exist. In some
jurisdictions (and years), the schemes are expressly designed not to cover the same emissions.
In some specific cases, schemes overlap. This is the case in the European Union where some
emissions are covered by the EU-ETS and by national carbon tax schemes. World Bank (2015)
estimates that approximately 4% of EU emissions are “double-covered”. To avoid double count-
ing emissions that are covered by both an ETS and a tax scheme in our coverage figures, our
calculations distinguish, within each sector, tax scheme-covered and ETS-covered emissions.
C Effective Carbon Price
Formally, the ECP of sector i can be expressed as
ECPi =
[τi × qtax,i] + [p× qets,i] + [(τi + p)× qtax,ets,i]
qGHGsi
(3)
where τi is the carbon tax rate applicable to sector i, qtax,i is the amount of GHG emissions of
sector i covered by a tax only, p is the price of an emission permit, qets,i is the amount of GHGs
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emissions of sector i that are covered by an ETS, qtax,ets,i is the amount of GHG emissions of
sector i that are covered by both an ETS and a tax and qGHGsi is the quantity of GHGs emitted
by sector i. Should a sector be covered by only one of those two instruments and all emissions
of the sector be covered, the ECPi would collapse to either τi or p.
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An economy-wide ECP is then computed as a weighted average of the effective carbon rates
across sectors, where the weights are the quantity of emissions subject to each individual carbon
rate:
ECPeco =
∑
i
(ECPi × γi) (5)
=
∑
i
(
ECPi × q
GHGs
i
qGHGs
)
(6)
where γi represents the GHGs emissions of sector i as a share of the economy’s (jurisdiction’s)
total GHG emissions. For the purpose of the present study, only the economy-wide ECP is
computed.
D Cross-correlation matrix
Table D.1: Cross-correlation table
Variables Elec. Prod Elec. Prod Elec. Prod Industry, GDP Trade EU Annex-I Inst. Level of Left
- coal - gas - oil VA per cap. Openness cap. Dem.
Elec. Prod - coal 1.000
Elec. Prod - gas -0.301 1.000
Elec. Prod - oil -0.329 -0.170 1.000
Industry, VA -0.054 0.315 -0.061 1.000
GDP per cap. 0.204 0.219 -0.249 -0.017 1.000
Trade Openness -0.158 0.204 0.123 0.214 0.085 1.000
EU 0.034 0.006 -0.063 -0.079 0.146 0.192 1.000
Annex-I 0.351 -0.117 -0.298 -0.305 0.565 -0.084 0.335 1.000
Institutional capacity 0.370 -0.077 -0.307 -0.295 0.748 -0.019 0.261 0.782 1.000
Level of Democracy 0.359 -0.305 -0.254 -0.391 0.315 -0.128 0.239 0.624 0.673 1.000
Left -0.044 0.042 -0.027 0.054 -0.204 -0.070 -0.131 -0.169 -0.291 -0.331 1.000
35Note that the quantity of GHG emissions is expressed in tonnes of CO2 equivalent. In addition, this equation
can equivalently be written as
ECPi =
[τi × (qtax,i + qtax,ets,i)] + [p× (qets,i + qtax,ets,i)]
qi
(4)
It makes clear that calculating the ECP does not require that one identifies overlapping emissions separately.
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E Jurisdictions with carbon pricing
Table E.1: Jurisdictions with carbon pricing schemes as of 2015
Jurisdiction Emissions Trading Carbon tax ECP - 2012
(const. 2014 $US)
Australia 2012 (2012) 7.89
Austria 2005 - 3.9
Belgium 2005 - 3.71
Bulgaria 2007 - 3.12
Cyprus 2005 - 6.35
Czech Republic 2005 - 0.21
Denmark 2005 1992 8.76
Estonia 2005 2000 7.08
Finland 2005 1990 32.79
France 2005 2014 2.54
Germany 2005 - 5.44
Greece 2005 - 6.25
Hungary 2005 - 4.03
Iceland 2008 2010 4.2
Ireland 2005 2010 10.76
Italy 2005 - 4.07
Japan - 2012 0.63
Kazakhstan 2013 - n.a.
Korea, Rep. 2015 n.a.
Latvia 2005 1995 2.58
Liechtenstein 2008 -
Lithuania 2005 - 0.82
Luxembourg 2005 - 3.36
Malta 2005 - 7.58
Mexico - 2014 n.a.
Netherlands 2005 - 4.1
New Zealand 2008 - 2.55
Norway 2007 1991 11.95
Poland 2005 1990 1.34
Portugal 2005 2015 4.01
Romania 2007 - 0.98
Slovak Republic 2005 - 5.45
Slovenia 2005 1996 1.27
Spain 2005 - 4.27
Sweden 2005 1991 63.72
Switzerland 2008 2008 10.79
United Kingdom 2005 2013 5.81
Alberta* (Canada) 2007 -
Beijing (China) 2013 - n.a.
British Columbia (Canada) - 2008 19.45
California (US) 2009 - 5.48
Chongqing (China) 2014 - n.a.
Connecticut (US) 2009 - 0.45
Delaware (US) 2009 - 0.79
Guangdong (China) 2013 - n.a.
Hubei (China) 2013 - n.a.
Kyoto (Japan) 2011 - †
Maine (US) 2009 - 0.10
Maryland (US) 2009 - 0.78
Massachusetts (US) 2009 - 1.9
Mexico 2014 - n.a
New Hampshire (US) 2009 - 0.85
New York (US) 2009 - 0.44
Quebec (Canada) 2013 - n.a.
Rhode Island (US) 2009 - 0.76
Saitama (Japan) 2011 - †
Shanghai (China) 2013 - n.a.
Shenzhen (China) 2013 - n.a.
Tianjin (China) 2013 - n.a.
Tokyo (Japan) 2010 - †
Vermont (US) 2009 - 0.00
†: missing information at the time of writing – Chile: 2017; South Africa: 2016; New Jersey’s scheme was
discontinued in 2011, Australia’s in 2012.
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